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The Bioeconomics of Conservation Agriculture and Soil Carbon 
Sequestration in Developing Countries 
Wisdom Akpalu and Anders Ekbom 
Abstract 
Improving soil carbon through conservation agriculture in developing countries may generate 
some private benefits to farmers, as well as sequester carbon emissions, which is a positive externality 
to society. Leaving crop residue on the farm has become an important option in conservation agriculture 
practice. However, in developing countries, using crop residue for conservation agriculture has the 
opportunity cost of feed for livestock. In this paper, we model and develop an expression for an 
optimum economic incentive that is necessary to internalize the positive externality. A crude value of 
the tax is calculated using data from Kenya. We also empirically investigated the determinants of the 
crop residue left on the farm and found that it depends on the cation exchange capacity (CEC) of the 
soil, the prices of maize, whether extension officers visit the plot or not, household size, the level of 
education of the household head, and alternative cost of soil conservation. 
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The Bioeconomics of Conservation Agriculture and Soil Carbon 
Sequestration in Developing Countries 
Wisdom Akpalu and Anders Ekbom∗ 
Introduction 
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the primary greenhouse gas that contributes to climate change. 
Reducing CO2 emissions is necessary to prevent the projected negative impacts of climate 
change (IPCC 2007a,b; Stern et al. 2006). An important area of mitigation is soil carbon 
sequestration. Agricultural soils are among the planet’s largest reservoirs of carbon—roughly 
twice the amount that is stored in all terrestrial plants—and hold potential for expanded carbon 
sequestration. Decreasing carbon stocks in the biosphere, including agricultural soils, have 
historically been a net source of CO2 emissions to the atmosphere (Marland et al. 2007).  
Currently, agriculture and other forms of land use contribute 32 percent to the world’s 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (IPCC 2007a,b). Moreover, each ton of carbon lost from soil 
adds approximately 3.7 tons of CO2 to the atmosphere. Conversely, every ton increase in soil 
organic carbon represents 3.7 tons of CO2 sequestered from the atmosphere. Therefore, 
integrated crop residue management (ICRM) promotes carbon sequestration and has a huge 
potential to reverse the net carbon flows from the atmosphere to the biosphere (Dick et al. 1998; 
Marland et al. 2007). As noted in the literature, best-practice organic agriculture emits less 
greenhouse gas than conventional agriculture, and the carbon sequestration from increasing soil 
organic matter leads to a net reduction in greenhouse gases (Drinkwater et al. 1998; Mäder et al. 
2002; Pimentel 2005; Reganold et al. 2001).  
Soil carbon is one of the most important factors promoting soil fertility, pest control, soil-
water moisture, and farm productivity. Specifically, soil carbon is a key component of soil 
organic matter, which consists of living microorganisms, partially decomposed residue, and well-
decomposed organic matter (humus). It improves the physical properties of soil, increases its 
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capacity to hold water, and contributes to improved soil structure. In addition, soil organic matter 
contains large shares of the soil nutrients and other soil properties that are important for healthy 
plant growth, prevention of nutrient leaching, and buffering of soil from adverse pH changes 
(Hobbs 2007). The management of crop residue may improve crop yields and land resilience 
against drought and other hazards, while at the same time protecting and stimulating the 
biological functions of the soil (Unger et al. 1988). As a result, increasing soil carbon 
concentrations through conservation agriculture generates private benefit, as well as the public 
benefit of mitigating GHG emissions.  
Sub-Saharan Africa’s contribution to GHG emissions through agriculture is just about 6 
percent of the global total. Nevertheless, this figure is expected to rise with increasing demand 
for agricultural products and changing food preferences. Because land degradation is 
accelerating as a serious problem, maintaining or enhancing farmers’ soil capital has increasingly 
become a prime focus for sustainable agriculture and increased food production. Yet, most 
African farmers face great difficulties achieving this. To a large extent, this is because farmers 
collect the crop or plant residue to feed livestock (livestock even graze freely on crop residue) 
and households use the residue as an energy/fuel source. This removal of crop residue, combined 
with low levels of fertilizer application, depletes soil fertility and contributes to the deepening 
poverty in many developing countries (Triomphe et al. 2007).  
Although resource-saving agricultural crop production is desirable, farmers are not likely 
to internalize benefits from environmental preservation (e.g., carbon sequestration) unless they 
are given adequate incentives. In this paper, we model a cropland management practice in 
Kenya, where farmers optimally allocate crop residue between reintegrating it directly into the 
soil (which improves soil quality, sequesters carbon, and therefore reduces net atmospheric 
carbon) and using it as fodder to feed livestock. Naturally, this poses a real trade-off for the 
farmer, because reintegrating crop residue into the soil, inter alia, reduces the amount of fodder 
available to feed livestock.  
We derived an expression for the optimum amount of residue that the farmer will leave 
on the farm and the corresponding optimum incentive (i.e., subsidy) necessary to internalize the 
externality if the residue allotted for livestock is used as private fodder or a common pooled 
resource. We found that the optimal subsidy should decrease in the marginal net benefit of the 
off-farm activity and wage rate, but increase in total biomass of crop residue generated. 
Furthermore, if the residue is used as a common pooled resource, then the subsidy should 
increase with the number of users. In addition, an empirical model that relates the optimal 
residue left on the farm and some socioeconomic determinants has been estimated. Using the Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
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estimated value of the residue left on the farm plus some parameter values from the literature, we 
computed a rough estimate of the subsidy.  
To put our research in context, it is worth noting that several biophysical and 
socioeconomic studies have been done on soil carbon sequestration and the linkage among 
conservation agriculture, increased productivity, and poverty reduction (see e.g.,   Antle et al. 
2007; Pimentel 2005; Antle and Diagana 2003; Mäder et al. 2002). However, the literature on 
bioeconomic models on the optimum allocation of crop residue is scarce. The closest to our 
study are Hartel (2004), Graff-Zivin and Lipper (2008), and Antle and Stoorvogel (2008). The 
common feature of these studies is that the benefit that accrues to the farmer for practicing 
conservation agriculture is in situ, or increased farm yield. Moreover, these studies seek the 
optimum incentive that should be given to the farmer for generating positive externality through 
soil carbon sequestration. While our study, like the others, seeks to determine the optimum 
incentive or subsidy, we have extended the existing models by considering conservation 
agriculture as a resource allocation problem, which is very common in developing countries. As 
a result, the magnitude of the incentive would determine the optimal allocation decision (i.e., the 
quantity of the residue to be left on the farm).      
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model and propositions are presented in 
section 1 followed by an empirical computation of incentive for the residue left on farms in 
Kenya (section 2). Section 3 estimates the subsidy rates and section 4 contains an estimation of 
the determinants of the crop residue left on farms. Section 5 summarizes our finding.  
1.  The Model 
Suppose a farmer cultivates a crop that generates some residue after harvest (e.g., corn 
stovers). Let  i R  be the biomass of stovers generated on plot i in the preceding farming season, 
which could be considered exogenous. If the farmer practices integrated crop residue 
management, then the biomass  ii R R −  is deposited on the field to improve soil quality and 
sequester carbon (a positive externality to society). Incorporating crop residue in the soil is 
costly, so we assume that the cost is linear in the biomass of residue deposited on the farm (i.e., 
() ii R R σ − , where σ  is cost per unit of the residue incorporated in the soil).  
The rest  i R  is used to feed livestock (i.e., an alternative agricultural activity). Thus,  i R  is 
a control variable. Let the marginal net benefit from this alternative agricultural activity be ρ , so 
that the total benefit is  i R ρ . The yield function of the crop ( ( ) , qq s L = ) depends on soil quality 
s (a stock variable) and labor input L. The farmer does not internalize the positive externality of Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
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carbon sequestration; the farmer therefore maximizes a value or utility function, which consists 
of the surplus from cultivation of the crop ( ( ) ( ) , ii qsL w L R R σ −− −) and the alternative activity 
( i R ρ ), given by equation (1) and subject to a soil-quality evolution equation (equation [2]). Note 
that labor usage depletes soil quality. From the soil dynamic equation,  ,0 α β > , implying that 
labor usage depletes soil quality and the crop residue left on the farm improves the quality of the 
soil. In addition, the price per unit of the yield has been normalized to 1, so that all other prices 





ii i Vq s LR w LR R e d t ρσ
∞
− =+ − − − ∫  ,  (1) 
such that: 
() ii sR R L αβ =+ − − &  ,  (2) 
where the following partial derivatives hold:  0 s q > , 0 ss q ≤ , 0 L q > , 0 LL q ≤ , and  0 sL Ls qq => . 
The price of q is normalized to 1. The corresponding current value Hamiltonian of the farmer’s 
objective function, expressed in equations (1) and (2), is: 
() () ( ) ( ) , ii i i i q s L Rw L RR RR L ρσ μ α β Η= + − − − + + − −  .  (3) 
The first order conditions, with respect to L and  i R , are equations (4) and (5), 
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Equation (4) indicates that in equilibrium the value of the marginal productivity of labor 
( L q ) equals the marginal cost of labor, which is the sum of the wage rate (w) and shadow value 
of the soil capital (μ ). Since  i R  is not an argument in equation (5), the optimum solution could Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
5 
be at a maximum value of  i R  ( max i R R = ) or minimum value ( min i R R = ). Suppose an interior 
solution exists. Then, the equation indicates that in equilibrium the marginal benefit from leaving 
the residue on the farm (βμ ) should equal the marginal opportunity cost to the farmer (ρ σ + ). 
From the costate equation, in inter-temporal equilibrium, the marginal benefit from depleting an 
additional unit of the soil capital today (rμ ) must reflect the opportunity cost, which is the sum 
of the soil capital gain (μ & ) and some output effect ( s q ). In a steady state,  0 s λμ === & &&  and 
* () ii RR =Φ , where Φ is a function of all the parameters in the Hamiltonian. Using a Cobb-
Douglas specification of the production function of the form 
v qA L S
ε =  with () ( ) 0,1 v ε +∈ , the 
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1.1  The Social Planner’s Problem 
Suppose a social planner wants to design an optimum economic incentive that could 
encourage the farmer to internalize the positive externality generated through carbon 
sequestration. Following Panayotou et al. (2002), who specified the damage from GHG as 
quadratic, let the term 
2 () ii R R γ −  define the external benefit from the leftover residue, and τ  be 
the marginal incentive to the farmer to internalize the externality. The quadratic specification 
indicates that the marginal external benefit is increasing in the residue. The corresponding 
current value Hamiltonian is:  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 1, ( ) ii i i i i i qsL R w L R R R R L R R τρ σλ α β γ Η= + + − − − + + − − + −  (7) 
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With the economic incentive, equation (8) indicates that in equilibrium the subsidized 
value of the marginal productivity of labor equals the marginal cost of labor. Also, equation (9) 
indicates that the marginal benefit from leaving the residue on the farm (βλ ) must equate the 
marginal opportunity cost to the farmer (i.e.,  2( ) ii R R ρσ γ +− − ). 
1.2  Economic Incentive (Subsidy)  
Proposition 1 
If conservation agriculture increases soil carbon sequestration, which is a positive externality, but 
decreases private benefits from an alternative agricultural use (e.g., livestock feed), the optimal 
subsidy necessary to internalize the externality is: 
()
** 2( ) ii RR w τγ β ρ σ =− + + . 
Proof:  Following Akpalu and Parks (2007), we equate equation (4) to equation (8) and 







=  (11) 
But, we know from equations (1) and (2) that  ( )
1
L qw βρσ β
− =+ − , and from equations (5) and 
(9) that  ()
1 μρ σ β
− =+  and  ()
1 2( ) ii RR λ ρσ γ β
− =+ − − . In addition, since 
* () ii i R RR =Φ = in 














The optimal subsidy necessary to internalize the positive externality from conservation 
agriculture should be decreasing in the marginal net benefit of the off-farm activity and wage 
rate, but increasing in total biomass of crop residue generated. Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
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 Proof:  The proof for this proposition requires taking the derivative of equation (12) with 
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 .  (16) 
From the comparative static analyses, the subsidy should decrease if the wage rate 
increases. This is because an increase in the wage rate, all other things being equal, makes it 
more profitable to substitute soil quality for labor. As a result, the soil carbon subsidy to farmers 
should decrease. Secondly, an increase in ρ , all other things being equal, makes it profitable for 
the farmer to feed livestock with the residue. Since the community is better off keeping 
livestock, the farmer should be given less incentive to leave the residue on the farm. 
Furthermore, if the cost of incorporating the residue in the soil increases, all other things 
including the marginal benefit from carbon sequestration remaining constant, the subsidy to the 
farmer should decrease. However, if the marginal benefit from carbon sequestration increases, 
then the subsidy should increase. 
1.3   Residue Removed as a Common Pooled Resource (Herds Feed Together) 
Farmers tend to collect residue or allow livestock herds to graze freely on crop residue. 
This may be an individual decision or, by way of insurance, the result of agreements and 
traditions regulating the relationships between farmers. Suppose the livestock within a 
community feed on common pastures, where the residue removed is stored. Let  ( ) M R  define the 


















is the individual i’s share in the benefit. The current value Hamiltonian defining the farmer’s 
problem is: Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
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The costate equation is: 
s rq μ μ −= − &  .  (20) 
Equation (19) stipulates that if the collected residue is used as a common pooled 
resource, the shadow value of the soil quality is some weighted value of the average and the 
marginal benefit from the alternative activity and the marginal opportunity cost of incorporating 
the residue in the soil. Note that, if  1 n = , we have an equilibrium condition for a private use of 
the resource, where the marginal benefit equals marginal opportunity cost. On the other hand, if 
n →∞, then we have an open access condition, where the average benefit equals the marginal 
opportunity cost. As a result, the marginal benefit from the common property management of the 
residue lies between that of the private property and the open access, if  ( ) M R  is nonlinear. 
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 .  (22) 
1.4  Optimum Subsidy to Foster Social Optimum Conservation 
The policymaker may want to design an optimum subsidy that will internalize the 
positive externality, assuming that the livestock is raised collectively by the farmers (as opposed 
to one farmer keeping all the livestock): 
() ( ) () ( ) ()
22 (1 ) , ( ) ii ii ii i H n q s L n RR w n L n RR n RR n LM n R τγ σ ω α β =+ + − − − − + + − − +
  (23) Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
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The costate equation is: 
s rn q ω ω −= − &  .  (26) 
Proposition 3 
If conservation agriculture increases soil carbon sequestration which generates crop residue that 
is used as a common pool resource, the optimal subsidy necessary to guarantee a socially optimal 
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Proof:  From equation (25), we derive the following expression for the shadow value: 
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Proposition 4 
If the crop residue collected is used as a common pooled resource to feed the livestock, the 
optimal subsidy necessary to internalize the positive externality from conservation agriculture 
will increase the number of users of the residue. 
Proof:  The proof of this preceding proposition requires taking the derivative of equation 
(29), with respect to n: 
()









 .  (31) 
Thus, as the number of the residue users increases, the opportunity cost of the residue usage, 
which depends on the number of the users, increases. As a result, a greater per unit subsidy is 
needed to encourage the farmers to practice integrated crop management. 
2. Computing the Crop Residue Left on Plots 
In an attempt to obtain a crude estimate of the economic incentive necessary to 
internalize the positive externality of soil carbon sequestration, we begin by computing ( ) ii R R −  
in this section. As noted in the literature, it is quite difficult to obtain data on the quantity of crop 
cover left on a plot. However, it has been estimated that the ratio of residue to maize yield is 
approximately 2:1 (see, e.g., Said 1982). Using this ratio, we computed the data for the maize 
residue generated. The crop cover left on the farm was then computed using a rating scale of 
0:10 (i.e., 10 percentage point increments from 0–100 percent). The rating, which is measured by 
field technical assistants, is derived from a practical expert assessment framework for evaluating 
soil conservation technologies as described in Thomas (1997).  
The data for the empirical analysis includes quality rating data for stover-deposits 
carefully collected in Muranga District in the central highlands of Kenya in 1998. Although the 
data is fairly old, farming practices in Kenya and many developing countries have remained 
unchanged over several decades. Moreover, this type of biophysical data is time independent. A 
random sample of 252 farms was identified. The sample constituted of 20 percent of the small-
scale farms within the study area. Unlike other countries (e.g., Ethiopia), the households in the Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
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area cultivate only one plot. Hence, a “farm” constitutes one plot. The mean area allocated to 
farming in our sample is 2.4 acres,1 indicating a relatively high land scarcity and fragmentation.  
A typical farm in the area is distributed in a narrow strip, sloping downwards from a 
sharp ridge. The farm stretches from the ridge crest some 100–150 meters down to the slope base 
at the valley bottom, until it reaches a stream or a river. The slopes are steep, with mean farm-
gradients ranging between 20–60 percent. Mean revenue from agricultural output of each 
household in the sample is about KSH 38,000 (≈ US$ 550).2 Maize (Zea mays) is grown on a 
larger proportion of the planted area, as both a cash crop and a food crop. The study area is 
classified as very fertile and has two rainy seasons with a mean annual precipitation of 1,560 
millimeters (Ovuka and Lindqvist 2000). Like other developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
the farmers in Kenya are poor and live on less than $ 2 per capita per day. Despite the fertile 
soils, yields are low and there is chronic food insecurity. The farmers use simple technologies 
(mainly hoes, machetes [panga], and spades) to till the land, establish and maintain soil 
conservation structures, and harvest crops.  
Based on the data, we computed the average stover residue generated (i.e., mean of R ) to 
be 1,269, and the mean residue deposited on the farm to be approximately 54 percent of the total 
(i.e., 695).  
3. Estimating the Subsidy Rate 
To provide a rough estimate of the optimum subsidy, we relied on some parameter values 
from the literature. First, an experiment conducted in Malawi showed that if livestock (cattle) 
feeds on the maize stover ad libitum, the average daily weight gain and consumption are 0.36 
kilogramand 3.6 kilogram, respectively (Munthali 1987). With 1 kilogram of beef currently 





where  0.44 θ =  is the price per kilogram of bag of maize in U.S. dollars). Second, the average 
daily rural wage in Kenya is $1.25 (i.e., 
1.25
0.44
w =  ). For simplicity, we assume that the cost per 
unit of incorporating the residue equals the wage rate (i.e., w σ = ). Third, Shafi et al. (2007) 
                                                 
1 The total farm size is on average 2.8 acres; some land is allocated to homesteading, grazing, or woodlots, or is 
classified as wasteland. 
2 KSH = Kenya shillings; US$ 1 ≈ KSH 70. Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
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found from an experiment that soil N fertility was improved by 29.2 percent due to crop residue 
retention. As a result, we assume that  0.292 β = . Fourth, since a one-ton increase in soil organic 
carbon could sequester about 3.7 tons of CO2 from the atmosphere (holding many factors 
constant), the marginal environmental benefit from the crop cover is 
0.00185
0.44
γ =  per kilogram. 
Bringing all these figures together, in addition to ( ) 695 ii RR −=, the mean ad valorem subsidy 
rate from equation (12) is computed as 
* 1.02 τ = , or 102 percent of the price of maize. Thus, 
given the current biomass of stover deposits, each farmer should be given a subsidy equivalent of 
the price per kilogram of maize harvested. Note that this tax, all other things being equal, will 
increase with the number of herders, if the collected stover is managed as a common pooled 
resource.   
4. Determinants of Crop Residue Left on Plots 
This section contains an empirical analysis of determinants of Kenyan farmers’ crop 
residue left on their farms. The dependent variables are soil characteristics, prices, and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the farmers (denoted Ω). Thus, our equation of interest is:    
  () (,    , ) ii i E R R R prices soil charateristics −= Ω  .  (32) 
In addition to the soil characteristics, a household survey was conducted during the same 
period to collect data on socioeconomic characteristics. Table 1 presents the descriptive 
characteristics of the variations used for the regression. 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean  SD 
Residue left on the farm (per hectare)  233  713.06  1367.525 
pH in water   243  5.618  0.669 
Extension officers visit farm  (=1, 0 otherwise)  246  0.236  0.425 
Household size   246  4.183  2.227 
Education ( in years )  244  5.652  4.436 
Cost of alternative soil conservation (in 1000sh)  243  0.240  0.599 
Age of household head  246  55.187  13.782 
Cation exchange capacity (CEC)  243  15.723  5.417 
Price of maize ( in 1000sh)  236  0.042  0.059 Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
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The summary statistics in table 1 indicates that the mean residue left on each plot is 
approximately 713 kilograms, with very high variance of 1269 kilograms.3 The data on soil 
capital was obtained from physical soil samples collected during the same period from all the 
farms. The soil samples were taken from the topsoil at depths of 0–15 centimeters, based on 
three replicates in each farm field (shamba). Places where mulch, manure, and chemical fertilizer 
were visible were avoided for soil sampling. The soil samples were air dried and analyzed at the 
Department of Soil Science (DSS), University of Nairobi.  
Based on geographical comparisons and laboratory analysis (Thomas 1997), the soil 
samples statistics indicated that the soils in the study area are generally acidic, moderate in 
carbon and organic matter, and have a low mean cation exchange capacity (CEC) of 15.72. The 
CEC is a value on a soil analysis report to indicate its capacity to hold cation nutrients. 
Generally, the more clay and organic matter present in the soil, the higher its value. The pH in 
water was also measured and a mean value of 5.618 was obtained.  
Of the total sample of 246 farmers who practice conservation agriculture, agricultural 
extension officers visited only 24 percent of the plots. Furthermore, the mean price of maize was 
KSH 42, and the average cost of alternative methods of conservation per hectare was KSH 240. 
In addition, the average household size was 4 people, and the head of the household had an 
average of 5.7 years of education. Finally, the mean age of the household head was 55 years.    
To obtain the estimated value of the residue left on each plot, we estimated an ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression with robust standard errors. The R-squared indicates that the line is 
a fairly good fit to about 27 percent of the variation in the residue deposited on the plots 
explained by the explanatory variables. From the regression results, plots with relatively high 
cation exchange capacity (CEC), on the average, have low crop-residue deposits, with the 
highest elasticity coefficient of 0.63. Second, households that sell maize at relatively higher 
prices left more residue on the farm soil. The corresponding elasticity indicates that a 10 percent 
increase in the price of maize could increase the quantity of deposits deposited on the plots by 
1.8 percent. Third, plots that were visited by extension officers had more residue left on the farm 
and farmers who could manage the relative high alternative cost of conservation, all other things 
being equal, deposited more residues on the farm.  
                                                 
3 Thorne et al. (2002) noted that in Kiambu, Kenya, average amount of maize stovers per hectare was 1116 
kilograms, which is close to our estimate. Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
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The policy implications are that extending extension services to plots could improve 
conservation agriculture. Furthermore, household size and the level of education of the head of 
the household are positively related to the quantity of residue deposited on the plots. 
Incorporating residue in soil is labor intensive. As a result, a big household size indicates that the 
farmer could afford the labor needed for conservation agriculture. In addition, a better educated 
farmer is likely to understand the benefit of conservation agriculture.  
 Table 2. OLS Regressions of the Determinants of Crop Cover Deposited on Plots 
Variable Coefficient    Elasticity t-stats 
pH in water   0.138  0.770  1.26 
Extension officers visit farm  ( = 1; 
    0 otherwise) 
0.626 0.146***  3.84 
Household size   0.069  0.288**  2.35 
Education ( in years ) 0.063  0.357***  3.70 
Cost of alternative soil conservation 0.423  0.103***  4.28 
Age of household head  0.005  0.249  0.87 
Cation exchange capacity (CEC)  -0.041  -0.634 **  -2.13 
Price of maize ( in 1000sh) 4.196  0.184***  4.29 
Constant 4.278    6.70 
R-Squared    0.27   
Observations    227   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Robust and absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. 
5. Conclusions  
Agriculture and land use are two of the largest contributors to the world’s greenhouse gas 
emissions (32 percent). Agricultural soils are among the planet’s largest reservoirs of carbon and 
hold—given changed practices—huge potential for increased carbon sequestration. Conservation 
agriculture is a somewhat different cultivation practice and includes conservation tillage and 
integrated crop residue management, for example. It may be a desirable option to maintain or 
improve soil fertility and crop yields of farms (by replenishing essential nutrients, such as soil 
carbon), and increase land resilience against drought and other hazards.  
Providing soil cover by leaving crop residue on the soil also has other private benefits, 
such as preventing or reducing soil loss and maintaining soil moisture on farms. However, in 
developing countries, leaving crop residue on a plot has alternative beneficial uses, such as Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
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fodder for livestock or fuel for homes. In addition, crop residue reintegrated into the soil 
sequesters carbon (offsets CO2 emissions), which generates positive externalities to society that 
are not typically internalized by the farmer.  
We modeled this trade-off and developed an expression for an optimum economic 
incentive that is necessary to internalize the positive externality. We considered two situations 
that represent the practice in Kenya:  whether the harvested residue is privately used as fodder or 
as a common pooled resource. The results indicate that the subsidy should be higher if it is used 
as a common pooled resource than as a private resource. A rough estimation based on an 
estimated value of the residue deposited on plots and other parameter values adopted from the 
literature gives an ad valorem subsidy of approximately 102 percent on the price of maize. 
Furthermore, we investigated the determinants of the residue left on the plot and found that plots 
with relatively high cation exchange capacity (CEC) have low crop residue deposits. On the 
other hand, households that sell maize at relatively higher prices, plots that were visited by 
extension officers, relatively larger household size, the level of education of the head of the 
household, and farmers who could manage the relatively high alternative cost of conservation 
left more residue on the farm land. As a result, policies that target any of these variables, for 
example, extending extension services to plots, could impact conservation agriculture within that 
farming area in Kenya. Environment for Development  Akpalu and Ekbom 
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